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James C. Kirby, Ir.*
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IX. STANDING To CHALLENGE CONSTITUTIONALITY
I. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER TO
METROPOLITAN CHARTER COMMISSION
The eighth amendment of the 1953 amendments to the constitution
of Tennessee' authorizes the General Assembly to "provide for" the
consolidation of city and county governments subject to approval of
such consolidations by majority vote of both the voters within a city
and those in the county outside the city. Obviously, the legislature
could itself pass a general act, or various private acts, proposing
charters under which city and county governmental functions could
be merged in one metropolitan government. Instead, it authorized
the preparation and proposal of such charters in the state's four
largest counties by local commissions which could be established
* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee bar.
1. TENN. CONST. art. 11, § 9, para. 9: "The General Assembly may provide for the
consolidation of any or all of the governmental and corporate functions now or
hereafter vested in municipal corporations with the governmental and corporate func-
tions now or hereafter vested in the counties in which such municipal corporations are
located; provided, such consolidations shall not become effective until submitted to
the qualified voters residing within the municipal corporation and in the county outside
thereof, and approved by a majority of those voting within the municipal corporation
and by a majority of those voting in the county outside the municipal corporation."
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either pursuant to resolutions of both the city and county governing
bodies in a particular county or pursuant to private act of the legis-
lature.
2
These general acts and a private act3 establishing a metropolitan
charter commission for Nashville and Davidson County were held
to be constitutional delegations of legislative power in Frazer v.
Carr .4 A unanimous Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed a chancel-
lor's ruling that such delegation was a lawful means of "providing for"
consolidation. The decision cleared the way for Nashville's new
metropolitan government, the charter of which had already been
approved by the required popular referendum.5
The court's decision on the delegation issue was based principally
upon two grounds: (1) In view of the legislative object, and con-
sidering that local conditions would vary from county to county, the
court construed the constitutional phrase "may provide for" as suf-
ficiently broad to authorize legislative delegation to local commissions
so that "the needs of, and reliefs to, each such county and principal
city in that county would be placed in the hands of representatives
therein who respectively knew the respective needs of such govern-
mental entities."6 In other words, this particular delegation was
constitutionally permissible from an interpretation of the language of
the constitutional grant of legislative power involved. (2) The gen-
eral legislation also contains sufficient "guide lines" to govern the
charter commission in its "preparation of a charter suitable for the
needs of the particular governmental entity it was serving."7 These
guiding legislative standards are not discussed, but the court obvi-
ously refers to the detailed listing in section 6-3711 of the Tennessee
Code Annotated of numerous mandatory specific charter provisions
and general considerations for the commission's guidance in proposing
a charter. It views these as sufficient legislative standards to control
the exercise of delegated legislative power. This brings this case
within the scope of generally valid legislative delegations and is
sufficient to justify the holding.
If one accepted as an absolute proposition the bare maxim that
legislative power generally cannot be delegated, it would be difficult
2. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-3704 (Supp. 1962). The basic metropolitan government
statute was enacted in 1957 and includes §§ 6-3701 through 6-3723. Section 6-3703
limits the entire chapter to counties of more than 200,000 population in 1950. The
procedure for creating a charter commission in a county was originally limited to
establishment by resolutions of city and county governing bodies, but a 1961 amend-
ment added § 6-3704(b) authorizing creation of a commission by private act.
3. Private Acts of Tenn., ch. 408 (1961).
4. 360 S.W.2d 449 (Tenn. 1962).
5. The case is also discussed in the Local Government survey article, p. 800 infra,
and subsequently in this article under class legislation, p. 667 infra.
6. 360 S.W.2d at 453.
7. Id. at 454.
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to attach any magic to the simple words, "may provide for," in an
underlying constitutional grant to the legislature. Such language is
hardly sufficient to authorize the use of an otherwise unconstitutional
legislative technique. Under Tennessee decisions prior to the 1953
amendments it was doubtful whether the legislature had constitu-
tional power to provide for city-county consolidations by laws de-
pendent for their effectiveness upon approval by vote of the people.8
Amendment eight clearly authorizes the legislature to pass a law
otherwise complete in itself detailing the terms of consolidation and
not only permits, but affirmatively requires, that its effectiveness de-
pend upon approval by a dual city-county referendum. To this
extent it clearly made a significant change in the constitutional law
of Tennessee. But to ascribe to the mere words, "may provide for,"
the effect of an affirmative grant of authority to make otherwise in-
valid delegations of legislative power would be giving these words
a far-reaching effect of constitutional change not apparent from their
ordinary meaning.
Suppose the consolidation legislation was clearly in conflict with
some specific section of the constitution. Could it be contended that
this language gave the legislature carte blanche to override any and
all constitutional provisions which were impediments to a desired
scheme of consolidation? The words, "provide for," appear at several
other points in the constitution of Tennessee and in each instance
they appear to be the simple language of an ordinary grant of power
to the General Assembly to legislate upon a particular subject.9 These
words alone could hardly be regarded as authorizing the legislature to
override other constitutional provisions or to delegate legislative
power if it could not otherwise do so.10 The words "may provide for"
8. Halmontaller v. City of Nashville, 206 Tenn. 64, 332 S.W.2d 163 (1960); Wright
v. Cunningham, 115 Tenn. 445, 91 S.W. 293 (1905). But see Clark v. State ex rel.
Bobo, 172 Tenn. 429, 113 S.W.2d 374 (1938), allowing local referendum to determine
the applicability in a particular county of legislation complete in itself and designed to
operate throughout the entire state.
9. TEN. CONsT. art. 11, § 7 (the legislature "may provide for" a conventional rate
of interest); art. 6, § 15 (the legislature shall have power "to provide for" the
appointment of justices of the peace); art. 11, § 8 (the legislature shall "provide" by
general laws for the organization of corporations).
10. TENN. CONST. art. 11, § 9, para. 6, one of the home rule amendments, ex-
pressly authorizes proposal of charters or amendments for home rule municipalities by
charter commissions similar to those used here. Such commissions may be "provided
for" by act of the legislature and elected by the voters of the municipality, or in the
absence of enabling legislation such a commission may be elected pursuant to a
petition signed by ten per cent of the voters of the muncipality. Since this amendment
was proposed and adopted concurrently with the eighth amendment, if one looks solely
to technical context and language it is arguable that the express authorization of local
charter commissions here implied an intent of the framers of the 1953 amendments that
such commissions were not to be used in proposing metropolitan charters of consolida-
tion. Although the court's opinion does not deal with this point, the two provisions
are distinguishable in that the home rule amendment was intended to be self-executing
19631
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should be regarded as merely conferring new legislative authority
in an otherwise doubtful area. Other established principles of law
justify upholding the legislative method employed in exercise of this
new authority.
What the court actually did was to exercise a commendable defer-
ence to the legislature's choice of delegation as a means of carrying
out a legitimate legislative purpose. This is involved in the second
ground of the court's reasoning: that the legislative power had been
delegated under sufficient legislative standards to guide and limit its
exercise by the charter commission. There is no constitutional pro-
hibition against delegation of legislative powers, and upholding the
metropolitan charter commission procedure is not a departure from
sound precedent in this respect. Reasonable delegations are one form
of legitimate means to legislative ends, and Frazer v. Carr affords a
good opportunity to put the so-called "non-delegation" doctrine in
proper perspective.
The constitution of Tennessee, in common with those of most states
and of the United States, contains no express prohibition against
delegation of legislative powers. The non-delegation doctrine, here
as elsewhere, has been based solely upon the typical clause vesting
the sovereign legislative power of the state in the General Assembly."
This basic provision has never prohibited reasonable delegations
under adequate legislative standards as a means of exercising legisla-
tive powers. Scholarly studies have concluded that the non-delegation
doctrine, as a principle of constitutional law, "is built upon the thin-
nest of implication, or is the product of the unwritten super-constitu-
tion." 2 Professor Davis describes it as a "judge-made corollary of
laissez-faire, inconsistent with positive government."13 The doctrine
is virtually a dead letter at the federal level and for many years has
largely received only lip service from state courts. At the most it
may now be said to require only that the legislature declare basic
and to provide a procedure whereby local voters could initiate procedures to amend
or establish municipal charters if the legislature failed to act. This made it necessary
for the constitution itself to specify some local procedure for evolving home rule
charters. See Washington County Election Comm'n v. City of Johnson City, 209
Tenn. 131, 350 S.W.2d 601 (1961); Kirby, Constitutional Law-1961 Tennessee
Survey (II), 15 VAND. L. REv. 847, 849 (1962). Specification of local charter com-
mission procedures under a self-executing constitutional provision should not preclude
the legislature from using the same method under a provision which it must implement.
11. "The legislative authority of this State shall be vested in a General Assembly
." TENN CoNs-r. art. 2, § 3. The separation of powers clause provides that "no
person or persons belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any of the
powers properly belonging to either of the others .... ." TENN. CoNsT. art. 2, § 2.
This prohibits only delegation of legislative power to the judicial and executive branches
to insure the three branches' independence of each other.
12. Duff & Whiteside, Delegata Potestas Non Potest Delegari: A Maxim of American
Constitutional Law, 14 Coarr L.Q. 168, 196 (1929).
13. DAvis, ADMImSTRATIVE Lv § 16, at 58 (one vol. ed. 1951).
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policy and furnish sufficiently precise standards for the exercise of
delegated power.14 Convincing argument is made that non-delegation
doctrine is "completely obsolete" and that it is now unreal even to
state it in terms of legislative standards because numerous cases
uphold delegations in the absence of any actual standards, either
by implying a standard from the statutory context or by ignoring the
supposed requirement of a standard.1
5
Judicial persistence in the non-delegation rule has frequently led
the courts to uphold legislative delegations as conferring non-legisla-
tive power or in Justice Holmes' phrase, a power "softened by a
quasi."16 This reasoning process has been put in a syllogism by
Professor Cushman as follows:
Major premise: Legislative power can not be constitutionally delegated by
Congress.
Minor premise: It is essential that certain powers be delegated to ad-
ministrative officers and regulatory commissions.
Conclusion: Therefore the powers thus delegated are not legislative
powers. 17
The courts thus often label the powers delegated by the legislature
as either "administrative" or "quasi-legislative," rather than concede
that the legislature has been allowed to exercise a portion of its power
through a subordinate body.
The trend towards upholding reasonable delegations without such
semantics is more than a recognition of the demands on modern
government. It is actually a return to fundamental constitutional
principles. As early as 1825 Chief Justice Marshall said on the sub-
ject:
It will not be contended, that congress can delegate to the courts, or to
any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative.
But congress may certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature
may rightfully exercise itself....
The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those important
subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from
those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and
power given to those who are to act under such general provisions, to fill up
the details.'8
If the courts had more consistently followed Marshall's lead, cases
14. MEnmuL, Ansm Tn.E LAw 48-58 (1954).
15. Davis,,op. cit. supra note 13, § 27, at 86-88.
16. Springer v. Government of the Phil. Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 210 (1928).
17. Cusm& N, THE INDvmwENr REGULATORY COMMISSIONs 429 (1941). See also
Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power: II, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 561, 567
(1947).
18. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 43-44 (1825).
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like Frazer v. Carr would be less difficult. Numerous delegations of
legislative power have been upheld in Tennessee, either by labeling
the delegated power as "administrative" or by applying an exception
to the non-delegation doctrine where the legislature sets forth ade-
quate standards to govern the exercise of the delegated power.19 It
is easy to find cases in which delegations have been upheld under less
precise standards than those governing metropolitan charter commis-
sions under section 6-3711. For instance, in 1960, in Gamble v. State20
the Supreme Court of Tennessee upheld a delegation to a county
board of health in which the only legislative guide was that the
board was to make such regulations as it deemed necessary "for the
protection of the public health." A criminal conviction for violating
such a regulation was affimed. It would be small comfort to the
defendant in such a case to tell him that the board's action was only
"administrative" or "quasi-legislative" because, as Professor Schwartz
has observed, he is certainly not imprisoned in a "quasi-cell."2'
Unlike the local health board in Gamble, the Nashville Metropoli-
tan Charter Commission was not exercising purely legislative powers
because its actions did not automatically have the effect of law.
Proposing the charter was only tentative in the legislative process.
Only an affirmative vote of the people of Davidson County could
breathe life into the charter and promulgate it into law, and this
delegation was specifically authorized by the constitution.
Allowing the legislature to utilize local commissions for proposing
the terms of consolidation charters is certainly desirable since such
bodies are more likely to be able to make the extensive study neces-
sary to produce a charter responsive to the complex needs of metro-
politan communities. The alternative would require that these com-
plicated, technical judgments be made by only the legislature sitting
in its brief biennial assembly.
The concluding ground of the court's holding may be the best: "To
be invalid a statute must be 'plainly obnoxious to some constitutional
19. One of the more candid decisions is Richardson v. Reese, 165 Tenn. 661, 57
S.W.2d 797 (1933), which collects several earlier cases upholding delegations of
legislative power and which quotes with approval this statement from 12 C.J. Con-
stitutional Law § 323, at 84 (1917): "'With the growing complexity of modern life,
the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased dif-
ficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the
delegation of greater powers by the legislature, and toward the approval of the practice
by the courts."' Id. at 667, 57 S.W.2d at 799. See also Department of Pub. Welfare
v. National Help "U" Ass'n, 197 Tenn. 8, 270 S.W.2d 337 (1954), and the general
discussion in Sanders, Administrative Law-1955 Tennessee Survey, 8 VAND. L. REv.
940 (1955).
20. 206 Tenn. 376, 333 S.W.2d 816 (1960).




provision.' ,2 It is a vain search to try to find a- provision of the
constitution of Tennessee offered by the metropolitan charter com-
mission.
II. RIGHT TO Juiy TRIAL: SPECIAL FINDINGS WrrTOUT
GEtNA VERDICT
The plaintiff's constitutional right to trial by jury was denied by the
use of Tennessee's procedure for special jury findings in Harbison v.
Briggs Brothers Paint Manufacturing Co.P Plaintiff contractor alleged
that he purchased from defendant paint dealer a can of liquid "bug
killer" to be used in killing fleas in the basement of a residence. He
also alleged that the defendant negligently failed to warn him that the
liquid was dangerously inflammable and as a result when he used it,
it exploded and severely burned him.
The jury had already been held beyond their regular term of
service when the case was ready for submission to them. The plead-
ings and evidence raised several issues of fact including the question
of whether defendant had actually sold the item to plaintiff. The
trial judge submitted this question alone to the jury and instructed
them that if they found for the defendant on this issue, the case
would be concluded and the defendant exonerated from liability-
but that if they found for the plaintiff, additional issues would then
be submitted to them. The jury found the issue in favor of the
defendant, and judgment was entered dismissing plaintiff's action.
The court of appeals held that it was error to submit a single inter-
rogatory to the jury but that in this case it was harmless because this
factual question was determinative of plaintiff's right to recovery. The
supreme court reversed in a divided opinion holding that plaintiff
had a constitutional right to have all the issues submitted to the jury
and to have the jury return a general verdict in addition to any
special findings.
The error of the trial court was induced by the fact that the appli-
cable statute does not expressly require a general verdict. Section
20-1316 of the Tennessee Code is as follows:
Special Verdicts.-The trial judge, in his discretion, especially where the
questions for solution are several or involved, may direct and supervise
the formulation of special issue or issues of fact for submission to and
answer by the jury. The response or responses of the jury shall have the
force of other verdicts at law.
22. 360 S.W.2d 449, 457 (1962), quoting from City of Chattanooga v. Fanburg,
196 Tenn. 226, 235, 265 S.W.2d 15, 20 (1954).
23. 354 S.W.2d 464 (Tenn. 1962).
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This provision appeared in the 1932 Code under the title "Special
Issues"24 and as construed by the supreme court in the instant case,
it does not authorize "special verdicts" as such but only special find-
ings in response to interrogatories submitted to the jury. Although
the two procedures are frequently confused there are important dif-
ferences between special verdicts and special findings in response to
interrogatories. A special verdict is in lieu of a general verdict; it
"finds all the facts involved in the case, but refers the decision of
the case upon those facts to the court."2 The instant case precludes
the use of special verdicts in Tennessee by holding that the right
to jury trial includes the right to a general verdict.2 6 Section 20-1316,
as interpreted, authorizes the submission of special issues or inter-
rogatories to the jury only when accompanied by general instructions
and a charge that the jury should accompany its special answers or
findings with a general verdict.
The majority disagreed with the court of appeals that the error
was harmless, partly because of the time element involved. It could
have rested its decision solely on this point. The jury might well
have been influenced, in their hold-over status, by the court's advice
that a special finding for defendant would conclude the case and
immediately free them from further duty. It is generally error for the
court to inform the jury of the legal effects resulting from particular
special answers.27 The court also applied the established rule that
the harmless error statute will not be applied when the error invades
a constitutional right.m
24. TrEN. CODE ANN. § 10346 (Williams 1934). There is some disagreement on
-whether the procedure was employed without statutory authority prior to 1932.
cIGINs & CRowNOVER, TENNEssEE PR ocEDUE ir LAw CASES 580 (1937); Wicker,
Trials and New Trials Under the New Federal Rules, 15 TENN. L. REv. 570, 575
(1939). However, in Turney v. Mobile & O.R.R., 3 Tenn. Civ. App. 628, 632 (1912)
the use of special jury findings together with a general verdict is discussed at length,
and lower courts are advised to use the procedure more frequently. Judge Higgins
states that if findings on a special issue conflict with a general verdict, the former
controls the judgment. The practice appeared earlier in Clark v. Keith, 76 Tenn. 703
(1882), but there the court stated that if a special finding were irreconcilably in
conflict with the general verdict, it would "feel constrained to reject the special finding
and proceed as if there had been none." Id. at 709.
25. ABBoTr, Crv.m JtRy TnrAs 951 (5th ed. 1935). See also Morgan, A Brief
History of Special Verdicts and Special Interrogatories, 32 YArx L.J. 575 (1923);
Wicker, Special Interrogatories to juries in Civil Cases, 35 YAiax L.J. 296 (1926);
Comment, Special Issues of Fact in Tennessee: A Look Behind the General Verdict,
22 TENN. L. REv. 1039 (1953).
26. The court states that although no Tennessee case holds that a jury may be
required to render a special verdict, "a jury may be instructed to return a special
verdict, in the event they cannot agree on a general verdict." 354 S.W.2d at 469,
citing Keith v. Clarke, 72 Tenn. 718 (1880).
27. Wicker, supra note 25, at 303.
28. Dykes v. State, 201 Tenn. 65, 296 S.W.2d 861 (1956); Tennessee Gas Trans-
mission Co. v. Vineyard, 191 Tenn. 331, 232 S.W.2d 403 (1950); Ford v. State, 101
[VOL,. 16
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The court's reasoning at several points emphasizes the common
law privilege of a jury to decline to return anything but a general
verdict, expressly holding the return of a general verdict to be an
element of the right to jury trial in Tennessee.' Suppose special
issues are properly submitted to a jury and it returns special findings
which conflict with its general verdict. Does its right to return only
a general verdict mean that inconsistent special findings must be
disregarded and judgment entered on the general verdict? It could
be argued that the right and power of the jury to return only a
general verdict implies a correlative duty of the court to accept it and
enter judgment accordingly regardless of inconsistent special findings
which the jury could have withheld completely. This would reduce
special findings to mere procedural devices to direct the jury's atten-
tion to particular issues. The Harbison holding requires no such
result.
Statutes authorizing special interrogatories to juries are widespread;
it is generally held that, although every effort will be made to rec-
oncile inconsistent special findings with the general verdict, if there
is an unavoidable conflict between them, the special findings control
and judgment should be entered accordingly.30 This does not violate
the right to trial by jury as guaranteed in federal courts by the
seventh amendment to the United States Constitution.31 The power
of a federal district court to disregard the general verdict is expressly
stated in Rule 49B of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The provision of the second sentence of section 20-1316 that the
jury's responses shall have "the force of other verdicts at law" is con-
strued by one treatise as giving them the legal effect of special
verdicts and thereby requiring that judgment be entered in accord-
ance with the special finding rather than the general verdict. 2 In its
discussion in the instant case the court noted that Tennessee's statute
is "more or less similar" to special interrogatory procedures of other
jurisdictions and by way of dictum said that "in case of conflict be-
tween such answers and the general verdict, the answers control."33
The paucity of reported cases indicates that the special interroga-
tory procedure is little used in Tennessee. The opinion in the Harbi-
Tenn. 454, 47 S.W. 703 (1898); Shook & Fletcher Supply Co. v. City of Nashville,
47 Tenn. App. 339, 338 S.W.2d 237 (M.S. 1960).
29. 354 S.W.2d 464 passim.
30. Turney v. Mobile & O.R.R., 3 Tenn. Civ. App. 628 (1912) (dictum); ABBOTT,
Crvm Jury TRBIIs 998 (5th ed. 1935); Wicker, supra note 25, at 298; -hiccis &
CrowNovER, op. cit. supra note 24, at 582. For a case going to considerable lengths to
reconcile a special finding with a general verdict, see Lenoir Car Works v. Littleton, 41
Tenn. App. 323, 293 S.W.2d 585 (E.S. 1956).
31. Walker v. New Mexico & So. Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593 (1897).
32. IGoINs & CnowNovw, op. cit. supra note 24, at 580.
33. 354 S.W.2d at 470 (dictum).
1963]
658 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [VOL. 16
son case goes far to clarify the procedure, and perhaps special interro-
gatories will now be more widely employed to prevent juries from
disregarding the court's instructions behind the cloak of a general
verdict. Special interrogatories force the jury to pay special attention
to specific points and tend to insure that the law is applied to the
facts as found by the jury. This does not infringe the right to jury
trial; it limits the jury to its proper function. The court did the
bar a service in this case by going beyond what was necessary for its
disposition to discuss the history, purpose, and proper usage of
special jury findings in Tennessee.
III. DUE PRocEss OF LAw: IN PERSONAM JuruSDIcrION OVER
NoNEmsIDENT INDIVDmUAL
In Goldberg v. Deane the Secretary of Labor brought suit in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee
against individuals operating a government surplus store in Memphis
for minimum wages and overtime payments due employees under the
Fair Labor Standards Act. One defendant resided in Missouri and
process was served pursuant to section 20-218 of the Tennessee
Code35 upon his agent, who supervised the store and resided in
Memphis. The district court held that such service was authorized
by Tennessee law and that it subjected the nonresident defendant to
in personam jurisdiction without violating due process of law.
The decision is in accord with modem holdings on jurisdiction over
nonresident individuals doing business in a state, but it is somewhat
unusual in that the court applied the pertinent Tennessee statute in
a situation where its application had been held unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court of Tennessee, in a decision which has never been
expressly overruled. In 1919, in Knox Bros. v. E. W. Wagner & Co.,
the Tennessee court declared that this general statutory provision for
service of process upon an agent of a defendant in counties other than
that of the defendant's residence could not be applied constitutionally
to a nonresident defendant who lived outside the state. However,
the court there had relied on the decision of the United States
34. 200 F. Supp. 161 (W.D. Tenn. 1961) (default judgment).
35. "When a corporation, business trust, or any person has an officer or agency,
or resident director, in any county other than that in which the chief officer or prin-
cipal resides, the service of process may be made on any agent or clerk employed
therein in all actions brought in such county against same growing out of the business
of, or connected with, said principal's business; but this section shall apply only to
cases where the suit is brought in such counties in which such agency, resident direc-
tor, or office is located." TENN. CODE: ANN. § 20-218 (1956). Rule 4(d) (7) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes service in the manner prescribed by the
law of the state in which service is made.
36. 141 Tenn. 348, 209 S.W. 638 (1919).
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Supreme Court in Flexner v. Farson7 holding unconstitutional a Ken-
tucky statute providing for service upon the resident agent of a
nonresident individual in suits arising out of business done in that
state. Flexner has since totally lost its vitality as a result of the case
of Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman and the landmark decision
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, which established the
current standard,-such "minimum contacts" within the state that
prosecution of a suit does not offend traditional ideas of fairness
and justice.
In a well reasoned opinion, the court in Goldberg v. Dean traces
the erosion in Tennessee of the principle of the Knox Bros. case. The
leading case now is McDaniel v. Textile Workers Union of America
°40
which upheld the Tennessee statute providing for substituted service
upon unincorporated associations and organizations doing business in
Tennessee. Concluding that Tennessee courts would no longer follow
Knox Bros., the court then felt free on both statutory and constitu-
tional grounds to reject the Knox Bros. case and to apply the clear
language of the Tennessee statute in the present case.41
An interesting collateral question which the court did not consider
is the effect of the previous state court holding of unconstitutionality
upon the statute involved.4 One writer has suggested that, despite
the erosion of the basis of the Knox Bros. decision, the statute should
perhaps be reenacted by the Tennessee legislature in order to give
it new vitality.4 3 However, the Knox Bros. decision did not declare
37. 248 U.S. 289 (1919).
38. 294 U.S. 623 (1935). The Goodman case held a nonresident partnership deal-
ing in securities subject to Iowa in personam jurisdiction, but emphasized that the
business was one particularly susceptible to state regulation.
39. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
40. 36 Tenn. App. 236, 254 S.W.2d 1 (E.S. 1952). The statute involved, TENN.
CODE ANN. § 20-223 (Supp. 1962), now also applies to nonresident partnerships. The
nonresident business is required to appoint a resident agent for service, and service
upon the secretary of state is authorized if such agent is not appointed. A federal
case refusing to apply this section to a nonresident individual doing business in
Tennessee under a trade name is Robertson v. Cumberland Gap Fuel Co., 202 F.
Supp. 801 (E.D. Tenn. 1962). Section 20-218 is not available against an individual
defendant unless he employs a resident agent in his business within the state. See
note 35 supra.
41. For a case holding that jurisdiction of federal courts in Tennessee over non-
residents is determined solely by federal law see First Flight Co. v. National Carloading
Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Tenn. 1962), 16 VAiD. L. BEv. 422 (1963).
42. Although the statement is sometimes made that a statute declared to be un-
constitutional is "not a law" or that it is inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing
no duties, Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886), the better view is
that since the courts have no power to repeal or abolish a statute, if it remains on
the books and the decision declaring it unconstitutional is overruled, it then becomes
effective. See Brrt, BRuToN, & HONNoLD, CONSTrrtn[ONAL LAw: CASES AND
MATEIALUS 110 (1959).




the statute unconstitutional, but merely held that its application to
the particular facts of that case would deny due process of law.
44
Consequently, reenactment should not be necessary in order for the
statute now to be applied to facts like those of the discredited Knox
Bros. decision.
IV. DUE PROCESS: EXPULSION FROM PUBLIC UNIVERSrrY
WrmouT HEARING
During lunch counter "sit-ins" in Nashville in 1960, the Tennessee
Board of Education adopted a regulation requiring the prompt dis-
missal of any college or university student "arrested and convicted on
charges involving personal misconduct." The plaintiffs in Knight v.
State Board of Education45 were students at Tennessee A. & I. State
University who traveled to Jackson, Mississippi, in 1961 as "freedom
riders." There they refused to leave a bus terminal waiting room in
response to orders from local police and were arrested and convicted
under a Mississippi disorderly conduct statute. While they were in
jail perfecting appeals, the discipline committee of the university,
after an ex parte proceeding without notice, suspended them from
further attendance.
Although letters of dismissal informed the students that their cases
might be "reconsidered" if they later showed they had not violated
the policy of the state board, when the students protested the action
after release from jail, they were informed by the university president
that their only recourse was to the courts. The students then brought
this suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Tennessee, alleging that their dismissals denied them due process
of law. This charge was sustained; plaintiffs were granted injunctive
relief prohibiting their expulsion from school for misconduct without
fair notice and opportunity for a hearing. The court did not pass on
the merits of their dismissals, but only on the procedural question.
The decision follows the recent holding of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education,46 where a
similar result was reached with respect to Negro pupils dismissed from
an Alabama college as a result of "sit-in" demonstrations.
On the narrow point of the right of a student in a public university
to at least minimal standards of procedural due process before expul-
44. The statute makes no reference to nonresidents of the state but deals with all
actions brought in a county other than that in which the defendant resides. See note
35 supra. As applied to suits against Tennessee residents in counties other than those in
which they live, it has never been questioned.
45. 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
46. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), 14 ALA. L. REV. 126 (1961), 50 GEo. L.J. 314
(1961), 75 HAnv. L. REv. 1429 (1962), 60 MicH. L. REv. 499 (1962), 38 N.D.L.
REv. 346 (1962), 35 TENi,. L.Q. 437 (1962), 15 VAN-D. L. REV. 1005 (1962).
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sion, the decision is in accord with the weight of authority,47 and it
does no real violence to Tennessee precedents. The leading Tennes-
see case is State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, which passed upon a
similar claim made by students expelled from the medical department
of the University of Tennessee for alleged theft and sale of examina-
tion questions. After notice of the investigation concerning them, the
medical students were successively afforded hearings before a special
board of students, a faculty committee, and a special committee of
the board of trustees. At each stage they were informed of the sub-
stance of the testimony against them and permitted to testify and
present evidence in rebuttal. This procedure was reviewed by the
Supreme Court of Tennessee to determine whether the students were
dismissed or suspended "without notice and a fair hearing." Although
denying that due process of law applied to academic disciplinary
proceedings, the court laid down requirements for notice and hearing
which are at least in accord with most rudiments of fair procedure.49
Although the Sherman decision has been criticized for denying ac-
cused students the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses
against them,50 the court indicated that the student must be at least
advised of the nature of the charge against him and of the names of
his accusers. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the Dixon case
agreed that a full-fledged right of confrontation and cross-examination
is not necessary under these circumstances, and the district court's
opinion in the Knight case referred to both Dixon and Sherman for
guide lines to an adequate hearing.
The court did not question the power of university governing
officials to promulgate the regulation involved; the decision concerned
only the procedure by which it is determined whether a particular
student has violated it. At the time of these plaintiffs' dismissal the
discipline committee could not have known the nature of their
47. Since public school administration involves the action of governmental agencies,
most cases indicate expressly, or by implication, that some form of notice and hearing
are required before dismissal of a student. State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180
Tenn. 99, 111, 171 S.W.2d 822, 826 (1942); Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 903 (1958). No
such rule applies to private schools, which are not limited by due process; in them
the student's rights generally depend upon his contract of admission. However, there
is some division of authority. Compare Barker v. Trustees of Bryn Mawr College, 278
Pa. 121, 122 Ati. 220 (1923) and John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102
So. 637 (1924), with Baltimore Univ. v. Colton, 98 Md. 623, 57 Atl. 14 (1904).
48. 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943).
49. "We think the student should be informed as to the nature of the charges, as
well as the names of at least the principal witnesses against him when requested, and
given a fair opportunity to make his defense. He cannot claim the privilege of cross-
examination as a matter of right. The testimony against him may be oral or written,
not necessarily under oath, but he should be advised as to its nature, as well as the
persons who have accused him." 180 Tenn. at 109-10, 171 S.W.2d at 826.




conduct. By its terms, the regulation applied only to convictions
involving "misconduct." While convictions of some offenses, such as
murder, rape, or larceny, might reasonably be determined to be
violations of the regulation without the need for formal notice and
hearing, minor criminal violations, such as traffic offenses or the
charge involved here, might, after a hearing and upon a full considera-
tion of the facts, be held by the authorities not to involve "miscon-
duct."
The decision in Knight is in accord with the trend of considering a
citizen's right to procedural due process when injured by action of a
governmental agency without regard to whether a "right" or "pri-
vilege" is involved. 51 The court expressly rejects this distinction,
noting that regardless of labels there is involved "an interest of almost
incalcuable value, especially to those students who have already
enrolled in the institution and begun the pursuit of their college train-
ing."5 Following a recent indication by the United States Supreme
Court that determination of procedural due process standards in a
given situation should turn upon consideration of "the nature both of
the private interest which has been impaired and the governmental
power which has been exercised," 53 the court readily concluded that
due process required that these plaintiffs be given notice and an
opportunity to be heard.
When any governmental body injures an individual citizen in his
enjoyment of a valuable interest, minimal requirements of procedural
due process should be met unless there is some overriding public
interest in allowing unfettered administrative action. The legitimate
discretion needed by higher education officials in governing public
colleges and universities is not likely to be infringed by recognition
of basic principles of fair play. Examination of the numerous cases
decided on this subject from various jurisdictions indicates that
procedures which are usually followed as a matter of course by
university officials will be held adequate by the courts.M
V. EQUAL PROTECTION: LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT
The long legal battle for constitutional representation of urban
voters in the Tennessee legislature took a spectacular turn during the
survey period with the historic decision of March 26, 1962, in Baker
51. See DAvis, ADn NsTHATnE LAw § 69 (1951); SOHwaARV-, AN INT1ODUcTION
TO AmnmUcAN ArmnNmTRA=vE LAW 122, 178 (2d ed. 1962); Forkosch, American
Democracy and Procedural Due Process, 24 BROOrLYN L. Rlv. 173 (1958).
52. 200 F. Supp. at 178.
53. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961).
54. See cases collected in Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 903 (1958).
[VOL. 16
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
v. Carr.55 The United States Supreme Court held that urban Tennes-
see voters stated a cause of action within the jurisdiction of the
federal courts when they sought relief from denial of equal protection
of the laws by invidious discrimination against them in the apportion-
ment of the Tennessee legislature. The prior proceedings in the lower
federal courts6 and related proceedings in the Tennessee courts57
have been treated in previous survey articles and the Supreme Court's
decision has spawned a plethora of legal writing8 matched in recent
years only by the school desegregation case. Attention will be given
here to subsequent proceedings in the United States district court and
the Tennessee legislature.
Upon remand the District Court for the Middle District of Tennes-
see set a pre-trial conference for May 7, 1962, at which the defendants
indicated they would not contest the allegations of the complaint and
defend the constitutionality of the 1901 apportionment. They asked
instead for a stay of the proceedings until a planned special session
of the legislature could consider new apportionment legislation. The
court continued the hearing until June 11, 1962.
Consequently, an extraordinary session of the eighty-second Gen-
55. 369 U.S. 186 (1962), 15 VAND. L. REv. 985 (1962). The proceedings on
remand are reported at 206 F. Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962).
56. Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1959). Discussed in Kirby,
Constitutional Law-1960 Tennessee Survey, 13 VAND. L. REv. 1021, 1029 (1960).
57. Kidd v. McCanless, 200 Tenn. 282, 292 S.W.2d 40 (1956). Discussed in
Sanders, Constitutional Law-1957 Tennessee Survey, 10 VAND. L. REv. 1002 (1957).
58. The most comprehensive single collection of materials is The Problem of Mal-
apportionment: A Symposium on Baker v. Carr, 72 YALE L.J. 7 (1962), containing
seven articles by distinguished writers. Among other individual articles devoted to the
subject are: Bonfield, Baker v. Carr.: New Light on the Guarantee of Republican
Government, 50 CAIw. L. REv. 245 (1962); Cormack, Baker v. Carr and Minority
Government in the United States, 30 W. & M.L. REv. 282 (1962); Cox, Current
Constitutional Issues-Reapportionment, 30 TENN. L. RPv. 28 (1962); Dixon, Legis-
lative Apportionment and the Federal Constitution, 27 LAW & CONTEN. PROB. 329
(1962); Edwards, Theoretical and Comparative Aspects of Reapportionment and
Redistricting: With Reference to Baker v. Carr, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1265 (1962);
Emerson, Malapportionment and judicial Power: The Supreme Court's Decision in
Baker v. Cart, 22 L. rN TRANs. 125 (1962); Friedelbaum, Baker v. Carr: The New
Doctrine of Judicial Intervention and Its Implications for American Federalism, 29
U. Cr. L. IRlv. 673 (1962); Hanson, Courts in the Thicket: The Problem of Judicial
Standards in Apportionment Cases, 12 Am. U.L. REV. 51 (1962); Israel, On Charting a
Course Through the Mathematical Quagmire, 61 Mici. L. Rtv. 107 (1962); Katzen-
bach, Some Reflections on Baker v. Cart, 15 VAND. L. REv. 829 (1962); Lancaster,
What's Wrong With Baker v. Cart, 15 VAuN. L. REv. 1247 (1962); McCloskey,
Reapportionment Case, 76 Hnv. L. REv. 54 (1962); Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in
Search of Law, 1962 Str. CT. REv. 252; Tyler, Court Versus Legislature, 27 LAw
& CoTrENMv. PROB. 930 (1962); Waddington, Legislative Appointment and the
Courts, 24 ALA. L. REv:. 65 (1963). Case notes and student material include: 27
ALBANY L. REv. 45 (1963); 42 B.U.L. REv. 553 (1962); 63 CoLm. L. R1v. 98
(1963); 11 CATHomc U.L. REv. 96 (1962); 12 DE PAuL L. REV. 133 (1962); 30
GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 1010 (1962); 34 Miss L.J. 117 (1962); 13 MERcEt L. REv.
445 (1962); 41 TmXs L. REv. 132 (1962); 36 Tur.. L. REv. 853 (1962); 24 U. PrrT.
L. REv. 171 (1962); 15 VAND. L. REv. 985 (1962).
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eral Assembly was held from May 29 to June 6, pursuant to call of
the Governor. Two separate statutes resulted, one reapportioning
seats in the house of representatives9 and the other dealing with the
senate. 0 Both were approved by the Governor on June 7th. The
pleadings in the federal court action were then amended to bring into
issue the constitutionality of the new statutes, and in a decision an-
nounced June 22, 1962, the three-judge district court indicated its
opinion that the new apportionment was also unconstitutional.
The court concluded that equal protection requires that representa-
tion in at least one house of the legislature be based exclusively
upon population or numbers of qualified voters, but that the other
house may be apportioned upon some other rational basis. The fact
that neither of the two new apportionments was based upon popula-
tion settled the fate of the 1962 legislation. The court chose, none-
theless, to examine each apportionment to give the next legislature
the benefit of its views on permissible "rational plans" for representa-
tion in whichever house is not apportioned according to population.
The 1962 apportionment of the house of representatives came close
to meeting the test of rationality. Its basis is a "two-thirds rule"
derived from the requirement of the Tennessee constitution that the
ininety-nine house members be apportioned "among the several
counties or districts, according to the number of qualified voters in
each" but with any county having "two-thirds of the ratio" entitled
to one member.61 The 1962 act extended this principle to apply to
floterial districts comprised of two or more counties each.6 This gave
a representative to sixteen floterial districts having less than the full
59. Tenn. Public Acts Extraordinary Sess. 1962, ch. 1. This will be codified under
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 3-101 to -106, which deals with apportionment of the General
Assembly.
60. Tenn. Public Acts Extraordinary Sess. 1962, ch. 3. The old provision was TENN.
CODE ANN. § 3-107 (Supp. 1962). Chapter 2 of these acts submitted to referendum
the question of calling a constitutional convention to consider legislative apportionment,
with delegates to be elected under the 1901 house apportionment. This was approved
at the November 1962 general election.
61. TEN. CONST. art. 2, § 5. The parties agreed in this proceeding that "qualified
voters" should be determined by the number of persons twenty-one years of age and
over according to the 1960 Census and that this was the basis used by the legislature.
The state's "voting population" was 2,092,891, thus making 21,140 qualified voters
the ratio for house members. Two-thirds of the ratio is 14,093.
62. This is presumably done in order to allow significant representation to counties
having less than the two-thirds ratio by combining them wherever possible into a
district meeting this requirement. Instead of "floterial," the apportioning statute uses
the term "joint representatives" and sets forth twenty-nine districts of two or more
counties each which jointly elect one representative from the district. Every district
contains at least one county not entitled to its own direct representative. Every district
"floterial" comes from the custom under which such representatives rotate or "float"
by local agreement or practice. MERmAm-WEBsTER Nnv INTErNATIONAL DIcTloNARy
(2d ed. 1957) defines a "floater" in political usage as "one who represents an irregular
constituency, as one joined by the union of two counties, neither of which has a
number sufficient to be allowed a (or an extra) representative of its own."
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ratio and, like the application of the two-thirds rule to individual
counties, had the effect of taking seats which would go to more
populous counties if population were the sole criterion.
Nonetheless, if consistently followed, the court was of the opinion
that the two-thirds plan for distribution of seats in one house would
be predicated upon an acceptable rational basis. It affords a measure
of protection in the legislature to governmental subdivisions of the
state which, despite their lack of a full ratio of voters, nevertheless
have substantial population and significant interests in state legislative
policy. In the words of the court, "The State has the right, if it sees
fit, to assure that its smaller and less populous areas and communities
are not completely overridden by sheer weight of numbers."6
While approving the two-thirds rule in principle, the court found
that its implementation in this instance had produced some in-
equities and unjustifiable discriminations which should be corrected.
Loudon County with 14,054 voters was represented only by partici-
pation in a floterial district with Blount County, having 32,849 voters,
but Fayette County with 11,652 voters was awarded a direct repre-
sentative, as was Sevier County with only 14,011 voters. Anderson
County, with 33,554 qualified voters, was limited to one direct repre-
sentative while three counties with considerably lower populations
were each given a direct representative and were also included in
floterial districts.
Turning to the Senate apportionment, the court found a "crazy
quilt" with no trace of a rational plan. Neither geography, de-
mography, nor governmental subdivisions could explain it. The
population ratios varied from 35,773 to 92,777 voters per senator.
Although the malapportionment heavily favored rural voters over
urban voters, the rural-urban discrimination could not account for the
pattern or demonstrate a consistent scheme. Looking only at rural
districts, those in east Tennessee ranged from 71,856 to 79,801 voters
each, while those in middle Tennessee only ranged from 35,773 to
39,812 voters. West Tennessee rural voters were near the rural
average, ranging from 40,306 to 51,119 per district. Middle Tennessee
rural voters obviously were heavily favored within the rural popula-
tion, largely at the expense of those in east Tennessee. Area differen-
tials were examined and found to bear no consistent relationship to
representation. Nor did the number of counties per senatorial district
which, excluding urban areas, varied from two counties to nine.
Looking only at the urban senatorial districts, the court found similar
internal discrimination, with the district ratios ranging from 67,121
to 92,772.
The court relegated to footnote treatment the only justification
63. 206 F. Supp. at 346.
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apparently advanced by the defendants as a rational scheme for the
senate apportionment: to allot three seats to each of the state's nine
congressional districts and then distribute the extra six seats among
districts having the largest areas. Not only was this a sort of "boot
strap" operation by which one malapportionment was urged to justify
another, but the court found that the scheme had not actually been
followed because the six extra seats had not been allocated on the
basis of area.
Having dealt with the mathematical problem, the court then turned
to the more difficult question of the remedy to be applied. If the
1962 statutes were declared unconstitutional, the court could hardly
avoid also invalidating the 1901 act which is subject to greater con-
stitutional infirmity. This would raise the difficult problem of the
decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee in Kidd v. McCanless,6
which held state judicial relief unavailable to remedy legislative
apportionment, partly on the ground that the de facto doctrine could
not be applied to maintain members of the legislature in office if the
statute under which they were elected were declared unconstitutional.
Although hinting at disagreement with the Tennessee court's view of
the de facto doctrine and indicating doubt that a federal court en-
forcing the federal constitution would be bound by the state court's
viewpoint, the court chose a path which avoided this question for the
time being. It specifically limited its opinion to an "expression of
views" on the constitutionality of the 1962 acts and refrained from
declaring them unconstitutional at this time. This enabled the 1963
General Assembly to be elected on the basis of the 1962 statutes and
gave a new legislature, elected under a less discriminatory apportion-
ment, an opportunity to enact a new apportionment in accordance
with the court's guide lines. Noting that the 1962 legislature did not
have the benefit of the court's opinions, the court expressed con-
fidence that the next legislature, elected under a somewhat improved
apportionment, would enact a plan in compliance with the commands
of the United States Constitution. The court, therefore, reserved final
judgment in the case until after the meeting of the 1963 General
Assembly of Tennessee, but not later than June 3, 1963.
A similar procedure has been followed by at least three other
federal district courts, and the court's course is a wise equitable
abstention in the hopes of minimizing conflict between federal and
state governments and avoiding what the court termed a potential
"far more drastic form of relief which could conceivably entail a
64. 200 Tenn. 282, 292 S.W.2d 40 (1956).
65. Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962); Sims v. Frink, 205




direct intrusion into state affairs."66 This obviously refers to the pos-
sibility of apportionment and supervision of elections under judicial
decree.
The 1963 General Assembly responded with new reapportionment
legislation for both the house and senate. Reports are that this legis-
lation will also be challenged and that the final chapter has not yet
been written concerning reapportionment in Tennessee.
The case of State v. Bomar 7 involves a related development in the
Tennessee courts. A petitioner for the writ of habeas corpus had
been convicted of rape and sentenced to death by electrocution. He
alleged that the statutes permitting his electrocution were uncon-
stitutional because they were enacted by a legislature chosen pursuant
to the 1901 legislative apportionment. He acknowledged that the de
facto principles of Kidd v. McCanles 9 require generally that the
courts enforce laws passed by the legislature in order to prevent con-
fusion and chaos, but urged that the court except statutes whose non-
enforcement would not produce confusion or chaos, which he alleged
to be the case in this instance.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee understandably felt that it would
at least promote confusion if it attempted to select among the
statutes of Tennessee passed since 1901 and invalidate particular ones
on this basis. The court also refused to accept the speculative con-
jecture that if the legislature had been properly apportioned the
offense of capital punishment would have been abolished in 1959.
In both respects the holding is difficult to criticize.
VI. LEGISLATIVE CLASSIFICATION: SUSPENSION OF
GENERAL LAW iFoR ONE COUNTY
Frazer v. Carr,7 0 the Nashville metropolitan charter case, involved
a challenge that the charter was promulgated by a legislative proce-
dure which suspended the state's general laws on city-county consoli-
dations in favor of the citizens of a particular county, in violation
of article 11, section 8, of the Tennessee constitution. The original
metropolitan charter statute provided a single method of creating
charter commissions: concurrent resolutions of the separate governing
66. 206 F. Supp. at 360.
67. 354 S.W.2d 763 (Tenn. 1962).
68. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3702, 40-3117 (1956). Since Tennessee statutes making
rape a capital offense date from 1871, the petitioner would not have been aided by
attacking post-1901 re-enactments of those statutes. The statutes providing for execu-
tion in the electric chair date from 1913, when this method was substituted for
hanging.
69. Supra note 64.
70. 360 S.W.2d 449 (Tenn. 1962), also discussed in this article under "Delegation"
and in the survey article on Local Government.
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bodies of a city and county within the coverage of the act.71 A 1961
amendment to the statute provided that a charter commission also
could be created in the manner provided by private act of the General
Assembly. 2 The Nashville Charter Commission was established in
this manner by a private act designating by name eight members of
the commission and providing for appointment of two others.
7 3
In upholding the metropolitan charter against this argument, the
court relied on the 1961 amendment's limitation of the private act
authorization to counties within the original law's population require-
ments.7 4 This was viewed as a reasonable classification which limited
the private act procedure to the state's four largest urban counties.
But this reasoning ignores the fact that these are the same counties
under the original coverage of the metropolitan charter law and that
consequently no classification whatever was made by this amend-
ment.75 The private act creating the Nashville Charter Commission
was the law which made classification an issue by singling out
Nashville and Davidson County for treatment different from that
given the other three major urban centers.
The court doubtless could have conceived a possible basis for the
legislature's provision of a special charter procedure for Nashville,
7 6
but the opinion does not discuss the point. In the absence of such
considerations the case is difficult to reconcile with prior decisions
invalidating suspensions of general laws for the benefit of one county
where no reasonable basis for the classification was shown.77
VII. LEGISLATION CLASSIFICATION: EXEMPTION FRoM
CARRIER REGULATION
Gasoline Transport, Inc. v. Crozier78 involved a 1961 amendment to
71. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-3704(a) (Supp. 1962).
72. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-3704(b) (Supp. 1962).
73. Tenn. Priv. Acts 1961, ch. 408.
74. Counties having populations in excess of 200,000 under the 1950 census. TENN.
CODE ANN. § 6-3703 (Supp. 1962).
75. It is doubtful that the amendment added anything to the power of the legisla-
ture to vary the operation of the general law with respect to a particular county. The
Supreme Court has previously indicated that such bootstrap lifting cannot aid special
legislation. "[Tihe Legislature has undertaken to authorize a suspension of the gen-
eral law by Private Act, which cannot be done under the State Constitution." Board of
Educ. v. Shelby County, 207 Tenn. 330, 355, 339 S.W.2d 569, 580 (1960). Discussed
in Kirby, Constitutional Law-1961 Tennessee Survey, 14 VAND. L. REv. 1171, 1189
(1961).
76. Such as that a local city or county governing body might have a special interest
in preventing the people from voting on a metropolitan charter and that an alternative
procedure was desirable to enable the voters to obtain metropolitan government without
affirmative action by such bodies.
77. E.g., Board of Educ. v. Shelby County, 207 Tenn. 330, 339 S.W.2d 569 (1960);
Town of McMinnville v. Curtis, 183 Tenn. 442, 192 S.W.2d 998 (1946).
78. 355 S.W.2d 98 (Tenn. 1962).
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the Motor Carrier Act which exempted any vehicle used in the
transportation of petroleum products from the operation of the act
"when the owner, lessee or bailee of the vehicle is legally and regu-
larly engaged in the business of selling or distributing such petroleum
products transported on such vehicle."7 9 This relieved such a carrier
from obtaining either a common carrier's certificate of convenience
and necessity or a contract hauler's permit. Common carriers brought
suit against the defendant Crozier alleging that the exemption was
an unconstitutional statutory discrimination. Crozier was a distributor
of petroleum products who received the products on consigment and
was paid on a commission basis. He had previously utilized a com-
mon carrier to haul the products from the oil company's terminal to
his place of business. Under a different arrangement made possible
by the new law, he was transporting the products in his own vehicles
and operating without any sort of authority from the public service
commission. Defendant's commissions were increased under the new
arrangements and complainants apparently viewed this as making him
a carrier for hire, who would be subject to regulation by the com-
mission except for the exemption.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee upheld the exemption noting that
it applies to any vehicle used to transport petroleum products where
the vehicle's operator is engaged in the business of selling or dis-
tributing such products. This was viewed as giving the operator of
the vehicle an interest in the transported products unlike that of an
ordinary contract hauler or common carrier, who is concerned only in
compensation for his transportation services, and thus justifying dif-
ferent treatment by the legislature. This seems reasonable since the
effect is to place the businessman transporting commodities which he
holds on consignment on the same basis as a private carrier who has
his own vehicle for transporting goods which he owns outright.
A better question, not dealt with by the opinion, is whether the
legislature can single out those transporting consigned petroleum
products for more favorable treatment than persons similarly situated
with respect to different categories of freight. 0 However, it is not
clear from the facts of this case that the defendant would have been
treated as a contract hauler furnishing transportation for hire with-
out the statutory exemption since he apparently was only paid com-
missions for selling the products and not specifically for hauling them.
79. Tsar¢. CODE A'TN. § 65-1503 (Supp. 1962).
80. Cf. Dilworth v. State, 204 Tenn. 522, 319 S.W.2d 481 (1959), invalidating
statutory discrimination between private carriers and carriers for hire with respect to
weight limitations designed to protect highways from damage. It would seem that
discrimination based on the nature of the cargo in Crozier, like that based on the
nature of the vehicle in Dilworth, bears no reasonable relation to the legislative
purpose in either instance.
1963]
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In any event, the common carrier plaintiffs could hardly complain
that the legislature had not created a broader class of favored
consignees.
VIII. EQUAL PROTECION: RACIAL DISCIMINATION
A quickened pace in judicially enforced desegration in Tennessee
is indicated both by the volume and the nature of the holdings in
such cases decided by the federal courts during the survey period.
One case from Tennessee was decided by the United States Supreme
Court and three others went to the highest court for review.
Turner v. City of Memphis8l demonstrates the flexibility and direct-
ness with which the federal judicial system can operate on occasion.
Plaintiff had been refused non-segregated service in a restaurant
operated by private lessee at the Memphis Municipal Airport. De-
fendant relied upon a regulation of the Division of Hotel and Restau-
rant Inspection of the Tennessee Department of Conservation which
required separate seating of the races in public eating places. Plaintiff
moved for summary judgment alleging that the regulation was uncon-
stitutional because of its obvious racial discrimination. Treating the
case as an action to restrain enforcement of a state administrative
order for alleged unconstitutionality, the district court convened a
three-judge court, which ordered the suit held in abeyance under the
abstention doctrine 2 while the plaintiff prosecuted a declaratory
judgment suit in the Tennessee state courts in order to obtain inter-
pretations of the state laws involved. 3 Uncertain of his appellate
remedy, 84 the plaintiff perfected appeals to both the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals and to the United States Supreme Court.
In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court cut through the
procedural tangle and brought the case to a quick conclusion in favor
of the plaintiff. The three-judge district court was held improperly
convened because the regulation was plainly invalid under the four-
81. 369 U.S. 350 (1962).
82. Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm. v.
Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496
(1941).
83. 199 F. Supp. 585 (1961).
84. If the action is one requiring a three-judge court under 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1958),
appeal from an order denying or granting an interlocutory or permanent injunction is
made direct to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1958). But where no
substantial question of unconstitutionality is presented, the single district judge should
dispose of the action without convening a three-judge court, whether the challenged
state law is obviously constitutional, Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933), or obvi-
ously unconstitutional, Bailey v. Patterson, 368 U.S. 963 (1962). If a three-judge
court is improperly convened, its action is treated as that of an ordinary district court
and appeal lies to the circuit court of appeals. Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246
(1941).
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teenth amendment8 and no substantial question of constitutionality
was presented for determination by a three-judge court.86 For the
same reason there was no occasion for abstention by the federal court
to await state court determinations. The appellant's jurisdictional
statement in the Supreme Court was treated as a petition for writ
of certiorari prior to the judgment of the court of appeals. In the
same opinion the Court granted this "petition," vacated the abstention
order, and remanded to the district court for a decree granting the
requested injunctive relief against discrimination.
The substantive law applied in the Turner case is now familiar.
The case is significant primarily for the procedural dispatch with
which the Supreme Court dealt with what it apparently viewed as
sham reliance upon invalid regulations to delay desegregation. The
case probably foreshadows an increase in the number of desegregation
suits which will be disposed of by summary judgment for plaintiffs.
Watson v. City of Memphis 7 involved desegregation of Memphis'
public parks and recreational facilities. The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals approved a plan of gradual desegregation of these facilities,
holding that the "all deliberate speed" standard of the Brown case
is permissible in these facilities as well as public schools. The plain-
tiffs contended that judicially permitted gradualism in desegregation
of governmental facilities is limited to public schools. As this article
went to press, the United States Supreme Court reversed the de-
cision.8
Northcross v. Board of Education8 9 was an action brought by Negro
parents and children to compel desegregation of the Memphis public
schools. The defendant board admitted that the races were attending
separate schools in Memphis but denied that this was the result of
compulsion on its part, alleging that no racial integregation had
occurred because no Negro children had made application for transfers
to white schools under the Tennessee Pupil Assignment Law 0 De-
fendants took the position that the assignment law was both an
adequate administrative remedy for the relief sought by plaintiffs and
also a sufficient desegregation plan for compliance with the Supreme
Court's decisions without any affirmative move toward desegregation
by school authorities. The district court held in favor of defendants.
On appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals this judgment was
85. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
86. Bailey v. Patterson, 368 U.S. 963 (1962), a case decided subsequent to the
district court's action in this case.
87. 303 F.2d 863 (6th Cir. 1962).
88. 373 U.S. 526 (1963). The Supreme Court opinion will be discussed in next
year's survey.
89. 302 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1962).
90. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-1701, 49-1764 (Supp. 1962).
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reversed and remanded with instructions to "restrain the defendants
from operating a biracial school system in Memphis, or in the alter-
native to adopt a plan looking toward the reorganization of the
schools, in accordance with the Constitution of the United States.""'
The court of appeals conceded the defendants an honest and
sincere desire to comply with the United States Constitution as
interpreted by the Supreme Court but held that they had pursued a
mistaken belief as to what constitutes such compliance. The con-
tinued maintenance of a biracial school system without affirmative
action to remove racial bars to admission to all schools is non-com-
pliance. The court said: "there cannot be 'Negro' schools and
'white' schools. There can now be only schools, requirements for
admission to which must be on an equal basis without regard to
race. . . . 'The maintenance of a dual system of attendance areas
based on race offends the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs.' .".."2
The Memphis school board was thus held to be under a duty to
take affirmative action towards operation of its schools on a racially
non-discriminatory basis. 3 While indicating some doubt as to the
adequacy of the Pupil Assignment Law as an administrative remedy
under any circumstances, the court held only that the assignment law
could not relieve defendants of their duty to initiate action to convert
their biracial system into a non-racial one.9
In Maxwell v. County Board of Education95 a modified "Nashville
plan" had been approved by the district court for Davidson County
schools outside the city of Nashville. The first four grades were
ordered desegregated immediately in order to place the county system
on a parallel basis with the city system. Thereafter, desegregation
was to proceed on the basis of one additional grade per year, thus
placing the city and county on the same timetable for total desegrega-
tion.96 On appeal by plaintiff the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed. The Davidson County plan also included the transfer
provision of the Nashville plan which allows the voluntary transfer of
any student assigned to a school previously attended solely by
members of another race or in which another race is presently in a
majority. The court of appeals adhered to its previous decision up-
holding the transfer plan for Nashville schools97 and ruled similarly
91. 302 F.2d at 824.
92. 302 F.2d at 822-23.
93. Relying on Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
94. "These transfer provisions do not make of this law a vehicle to reorganize the
schools on a non-racial basis. . . .Negro children cannot be required to apply for
that to which they are entitled as a matter of right." 302 F.2d at 823 (1962).
95. 301 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1962), rev'd as to transfer provisions, 373 U.S. 683
(1963).
96. The district court's opinion is reported at 203 F. Supp. 768 (M.D. Tenn. 1960).
97. Kelley v. Board of Educ., 270 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361
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for Davidson County. In a 1963 decision the United States Supreme
Court reversed on the transfer question, holding that a classification
based on race for purposes of transfer between public schools violates
the equal protection clause. 8
Limited and gradual desegregation of Chattanooga schools was
ordered in Mapp v. Board of Education.9 The defendants had
originally defended on the grounds that they were engaged in a good
faith program of public education preliminary to any actual imple-
mentation of desegregation. This resulted in summary judgment for
plaintiff which was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 100
After submission of several desegregation plans and extensive hear-
ings, the court approved a modified "Nashville plan." Initial desegre-
gation is limited to sixteen designated elementary schools in which
grades one through three will be desegregated in September 1963.
The first four grades in all schools are to be desegregated one year
later. Thereafter, two grades will be desegregated in each annual
step except for the first years of junior high school and high school
where only the one grade at a time will be desegregated in the
stair step procedure.
In rejecting plaintiff's demand for immediate and total desegrega-
tion, the court relied principally upon the good faith efforts of de-
fendant, administrative and financial problems, and local hostility to
integration. In merging two school systems into one, careful planning
is necessary with respect to size of both classes and schools because
of intricate problems involving divisions of state funds based on
various size and attendance factors. The court recognized that under
Cooper v. Aaron'0 ' neither community hostility nor even actual or
threatened violence could justify a school board either in delay-
ing a start towards desegregation or totally suspending its imple-
mentation. Nevertheless, where a prompt and reasonable start is
made towards full desegregation and it appears that school authorities
are acting in good faith, the court regarded local attitudes towards
desegregation as a proper factor for consideration in arriving at the
details of a plan.
In a significant departure from the Nashville plan, the court dis-
approved inclusion of its transfer provisions in the Chattanooga plan
and expressed doubts as to its constitutionality.102 However, the board
U.S. 924 (1959).
98. Gross v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963). A detailed discussion must
necessarily be postponed until next year.
99. 203 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
100. 295 F.2d 617 (6th Cir. 1961).
101. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
102. Noting the holding of the Fifth Circuit in Boson v. Bippy, 285 F.2d 43 (5th
Cir. 1960), contrary to that of the Sixth Circuit in the Kelley case, supra note 97.
The court also had evidence that the Nashville transfer plan had "minimized progress"
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was authorized to adopt any admission or transfer plan it deemed
reasonable or proper so long as it was not to any extent based upon
race and did not have as its primary purpose the delay or prevention
of implementation of the desegregation plan. The recent Supreme
Court decision 03 throwing out the Nashville transfer plan confirms
the Mapp court view.
Vick v. County Board of Education'04 is the only reported school
desegregation case from outside the state's principal metropolitan
areas. The district court had previously ordered defendants to sub-
mit a plan for complete desegregation of Obion County Schools for the
1962-63 school year. Upon consideration of a proposed plan the court
followed the lead of the Chattanooga case and likewise disapproved
inclusion of the transfer provision of the Nashville plan, substituting
instead the same provisions approved for the Chattanooga plan.
The principal point of controversy in the Obion County plan was
its "free choice" provisions. In school districts containing both pre-
viously white and previously Negro schools, both white and Negro
children were given full choice as to which schools to attend. Because
the freedom of choice is equally available to white and Negro children
in every school within a district, this provision is not subject to the
objections to the Nashville transfer plan. The fact that it might allow
segregation to continue along previous patterns was held to be no
objection because it is elimination of racial discrimination, not com-
pulsory integration, which is required. The court also rejected argu-
ments against the choice provisions based on the subservient
economic position of Negroes in rural Obion County, which was
alleged to make them vulnerable to economic pressure in the exercise
of their choice,10s and ignorance of Negro parents and students, which
allegedly would prevent them from intelligent understanding and
exercise of their opportunities for choice. 10
In Goss v. Board of Education0 7 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the district court's approval of grade-a-year desegregation
for Knoxville schools beginning with the first grade in 1960-61. Con-
under its desegregation plan and viewed the transfer provisions as likely to "delay the
implementation of a plan already gradual in its provisions, if not prevent its ever
becoming fully adopted." 203 F. Supp. at 853.
103. Goss v. Board of Educ., supra note 98.
104. 205 F. Supp. 436 (W.D. Tenn. 1962).
105. Noting that economic pressure aimed at depriving a citizen of federally-created
rights can be prevented by separate action if necessary, and citing United States v.
Beaty, 288 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1961).
106. However, the court did require as a safeguard that counsel for plaintiffs be
furnished with the names and addresses of all Negro school children who would have
a choice of school. 205 F. Supp. at 441.
107. 301 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1962), rev'd as to transfer pro'vlsions, 373 U.S. 683
(1963). A portion of the Knoxville proceedings dealing only with details of desegrega-
tion of vocational and technical courses is reported at 305 F.2d 523 (1962).
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sidering that five years had elapsed since the Supreme Court's original
school segregation decision, the court regarded twelve years as too
long an additional period for the accomplishment of complete de-
segregation. The appellate court was influenced against the de-
fendants' position by their admission that they had deliberately
awaited legal compulsion before considering any steps towards
desegregation. Expressly disclaiming any attempt to formulate or
dictate details, the court merely remanded with instructions that the
defendant school board be required to submit promptly "an amended
and realistic plan for the acceleration of desegregation," in accordance
with views expressed in the opinion.
The Knoxville plan also included the Nashville transfer features
previously upheld by the Sixth Circuit. The court again adhered to
its position that such provisions are not unlawful on their face but
warned that they cannot be administered as a means of perpetuating
segregation, likening them to pupil assignment laws which have been
held not inherently unconstitutional 18 but which are subject to in-
validity if used administratively over a period of time to systemati-
cally accomplish racial discrimination. As has been noted, the Su-
preme Court has recently disapproved these provisions. 1 9
A Tennessee state court case arising in a racial context is Ford v.
State" ° which affirmed criminal convictions under the Tennessee
statute punishing disturbance of religious assemblies."' A group of
Negro youths appeared during a religious meeting held in a municipal
facility of the city of Memphis. They were first asked not to enter
and then to take seats in the rear. They refused to do this and upon
instruction from an apparent leader to "scatter out" they broke into
groups and dispersed through the audience while the meeting was in
progress. Most of them passed up empty seats at the ends of rows and
stepped over people already seated in order to take center seats. A
general disruption of the meeting resulted, followed by arrest of these
defendants.
The statute was construed to apply to any willful disturbance of a
religious assembly in any manner. An argument that public owner-
ship of the facility gave defendants a right not to be excluded was
108. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Board of Edue., 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala.),
aff'd, 358 U.S. 101 (1958).
109. Goss v. Board of Educ., supra note 98.
110. 355 S.W.2d 102 (Tenn. 1962).
111. TENN. ConE ANN. § 39-1204 (1956): "If any person willfully disturb or dis-
quiet any assemblage of persons met for religious worship, or for educational or literary
purposes, or as a lodge or for the purpose of engaging in or promoting the cause of
temperance, by noise, profane discourse, rude or indecent behavior, or any other act,
at or near the place of meeting, he shall be fined not less than twenty dollars ($20.00)
nor more than two hundred dollars ($200), and may also be imprisoned not exceeding
six (6) months in the county jail."
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viewed as immaterial because it was not the defendants' presence
but their conduct in willfully disturbing a religious meeting which
was being punished.
IX. STANDING To CHALLENGE CoNsnTuTIoNALITY
The Supreme Court of Tennessee followed its precedents on stand-
ing to challenge constitutionality of a statute in Campbell v. Unicoi
County."2 Under prior law Campbell had been elected county road
superintendent by the quarterly court for a term of office which
expired on November 1, 1961. A 1961 private act changed both the
mode of election and the term of office of future superintendents and
provided for an interim appointment to the office by the Governor.
When his term expired, Campbell refused to deliver up the office to
the appointee contending that the statute providing for gubernatorial
appointment was unconstitutional. He brought suit against the county
and the interim appointee seeking a declaratory judgment on the
question. A demurrer to his action was sustained by the lower courts
on the ground that Campbell, as a holdover in office, lacked standing
to raise the question. The interim appointee then sought a writ of
mandamus to compel Campbell to surrender the office and Campbell's
demurrer to this action was overruled for the same reason. On appeal
to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, the two cases were consolidated
and in each of them the action of the lower court was affirmed.
In Tennessee a holdover in office is viewed as continuing to serve,
not by reason of any vested interest which he has in the office, but
solely for the benefit of the public to prevent interruption in the
public service. In the language of the court in the present case he
was only "to hold said office and to protect records and other public
property in his possession until such time as his successor in office
appeared ... ."13 One could easily reason that it is his duty to
protect the office from assumption by someone not entitled to it" 4 or
by a person acting unlawfully or under authority of void statute, and
that he therefore should have standing to question the constitution-
ality of the law purporting to vest the office in a successor. None-
theless, a contrary view is well established by Tennessee cases." 5
112. 356 S.W.2d 264 (Tenn. 1962).
113. 356 S.W.2d at 267. Most cases dealing with the status of a holdover arise %vhen
he argues that there is no "vacancy" in the office within the purview of an admittedly
valid appointive power. 43 Am. Jur. Public Officers § 164, at 21 (1942).
114. It is generally stated that the "successor" to whom a holdover surrenders his
office must be "legally elected or appointed and duly qualified." 67 C.J.S. Officers §
48, at 205 (1950).
115. State ex rel. Turner v. Wilson, 196 Tenn. 152, 264 S.W.2d 796 (1954);
Kimsey v. Hyatt, 169 Tenn. 599, 89 S.W.2d 887 (1936); State ex rel. Barham v.
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Despite his personal pecuniary loss when displaced from office, the
holdover official is treated as a mere member of the general public
with no special interest in the statute apart from that common to all
citizens generally. Viewed in this way, he lacks sufficient justiciable
interest to raise the question of constitutionality."
6
Graham, 161 Tenn. 557, 30 S.W.2d 274 (1930); Graham v. England, 154 Tenn. 435,
288 S.W. 728 (1926).
116. Walldorf v. City of Chattanooga, 192 Tenn. 86, 237 S.W.2d 939 (1951).
